T-Tail-Tall-Tail:
It Was a Bad Day to Fly!
Lee Waters
(An account submitted for the Sun Coast
Daedalian Flight's Dobee Award for
"The Most Engines Lost During a Non-Combat Personnel
Airdrop Mission".)
Note: To the best of my recollection the following
event happened sometime
during the summer of 1971. I also believe that the
C-141 tail number was 38078,
although I have been unable to retrieve any Form 5
records of the flight. At
the time I was assigned to either the 30th or the
6th MAS at McGuire AFB, NJ.
The airdrop mission began just like many personnel
airdrops I had flown
previously. At the squadron we three crews involved
in the formation flight
received the standard pre-mission briefing. I was
informed that my crew and I
would be flying position number two of a three-ship
formation flight flying
from McGuire to Ft. Bragg, making a personnel
airdrop, without landing, and
then flying back to McGuire for landing and mission
termination. Each of the
three aircraft would be dropping a relatively small
group of Army reserve
paratroopers who badly needed the parachute drop to
maintain their currency and
not lose their jump pay.
Preflight inspections were normal as was our flight
planning at Base
Operations. Fortunately the weather would be "severe
clear" all the way around
the flight planned route with light and variable
winds at McGuire and at the
drop zone. Piece of cake….
Once at the aircraft I met with the Army paratroops
we would be dropping. There
were an even dozen of them. The Jumpmaster was very
experienced with many jumps
under his belt, but most of the others were less
experienced. I gave the
combined aircrew and paratroops the normal briefing
after which the jumpmaster
took me aside and told me that they really needed to
complete the airdrop in
order to continue to receive their jump pay. It
seemed that they had put off
scheduling the time away from their civilian jobs to
do the jump until they
were close to the last days of their eligibility. I
said I would do everything
I could to ensure they got their drop.
Start, taxi, and takeoff were uneventful and,
following takeoff, our three
aircraft joined up during the initial stages of the
climb out. My aircraft was
in the number two position as planned. Our three
C-141s had taken off to the
south from McGuire, so we made a gentle left turn to
fly over Atlantic City's
VOR to pick up the airway for our continued climb to
cruise altitude and the
flight down to Ft. Bragg for our airdrop.
Passing over the Atlantic City airport's VOR and
climbing through about 19,000
feet altitude, I was shocked to hear the number
three engine begin to
compressor stall severely! It was booming and
banging so hard I had a real
concern that the engine would either start throwing
out turbine or compressor
blades or fly off the pylon since there were only
two big bolts attaching the
engine to the pylon mounts. The whole aircraft was
shuddering and vibrating!
The vertical scale engine instruments for number
three would drop to zero
following a loud BANG! that reverberated throughout
the aircraft. Then the
engine would re-light from the continuous ignition
and begin spooling up to
match the throttle's climb power position. Then
BANG! and the whole thing would
repeat itself. I rapidly performed the emergency
procedure which directed the
throttle to be retarded toward the idle position
until the engine settled down,
then to advance the throttle back to power. I
retarded the throttle, but the
only time number three would settle down was at
idle. The minute I began
inching the throttle out of idle the severe banging
would begin again.
Remembering the Jumpmaster's predicament, I rapidly
reviewed my options and the
regulatory constraints that applied. I basically had
two choices: 1) Return to
base and scrub the mission and hope the troops could
get another drop in a
hurry (which was a remote possibility) or, 2) to
continue with the drop with
three engines at normal power and number three
engine operating at idle.
Technically, I decided, I did have all four engines
running and the airdrop was
important to complete. But the safe thing would be
for me to swap positions
with the number three aircraft so if anything
further happened during the drop
at low altitude and airspeed, I wouldn't have my
options limited by an aircraft
immediately behind me, nor have the possibility of
me flying right behind a
steam of parachutists jumping out of both sides of
number one. I surely didn't
want to fly through the troopers in their 'chutes if
the worse happened and I
couldn't hold altitude. So I advised Lead of my
predicament and suggested that
number three and my aircraft exchange positions and
I would continue as
tail-end Charlie. When he asked, I told him I had
about 3000 hours in the
aircraft and that I held an instructor pilot
qualification level. Lead was
somewhat hesitant to allow it, but my plan did
eliminate or reduce any risk to
minimal and I would be technically within the
regulations, so he agreed.
All three of us aircraft commanders quickly devised
a plan. In changing
positions, I would slide out to the right until well
clear of the formation,
then number three would move up to the number two
position. I would then drift
back to become level with the vacated number three
position and subsequently
slide left into position. It seemed like a solid
plan to all of us and our
navigators had enough time remaining enroute to
adjust their lead point and
drop timings, so Lead directed us to begin. I
briefed my crew on intercom and
no one had a problem with it. The Loadmaster would
bring the Jumpmaster up to
date on what was happening.
Just as I was beginning my slight right turn out of
position, number one and
two engines started to boom and bang just as number
three had done not more
than three minutes before! BOOM, BANG, SHUDDER! The
aircraft felt like it was
going to come apart any second! I pulled those two
engine throttles back to
idle, checked my altitude (passing 21,000 feet) and
directed the Flight
Engineer to change feeding the engines out of
different fuel tanks (in case of
bad fuel) and yelled (I am embarrassed to remember)
over the interplane radio
that two more engines were doing the same thing! I
said I was returning to
McGuire or going to perform a power-idle glide into
Atlantic City's airport if
number four began doing the same thing!! I quickly
informed the loadmaster what
was happening and as I was telling him, he informed
me that the Jumpmaster was
running up front to talk with me. I turned back to
look at the cockpit entry
door and as I did, I saw that the cockpit seemed to
be about five times bigger
than it actually was! Adrenalin? Yup; bet on it!
The Jumpmaster hurried up to me and yelled that his
men wanted to jump out of
the airplane! (They didn't care if we would have
been 20 miles out over the
ocean; they just wanted to depart the sick aircraft
which sounded like it was
going to break up.) I quickly thought that request
through, but was confident
with the altitude I had and the fact Atlantic City's
airport was under us and
that McGuire wasn't too far away, I could get them
back without them having to
walk a long way back to civilization for rescue. I
also wasn't about to
compound my control problems by increasing drag on
the aircraft that slowing
down to drop speed and opening a door for them to
jump out of would have
caused. So I promised him I would get them back to a
safe landing either at
Atlantic City's airport or McGuire and told him to
return to his seat.
After leveling off and declaring an emergency with
our departure controllers, I
told the controller of my intentions to attempt to
return directly to McGuire
essentially under a powered glide. We were cleared
direct, given a heading to
pick up and an altitude to descend to. I told the
controller I would prefer to
keep as much altitude as I could until I was sure of
the landing at McGuire.
With the three ailing engines at idle, number four
at climb power and the
aircraft trimmed up, I still couldn't maintain
altitude. The best I could do
was a 300 feet per minute slow descent. I didn't
want to retry any of the three
bad engines because the compressor stalls had been
so severe my crew and I
believed serious or catastrophic damage would happen
if I tried to increase the
power. I planned to use the sick engines only if it
became evident that we
wouldn't make the field safely. Thank God the
weather was clear with about 10
miles visibility.
Our controller handed us off to the McGuire approach
controller who must not
have been briefed very well because he immediately
told us to descend and
maintain 1500 feet altitude. I told him what the
situation was and to just give
us headings to the runway. I requested a reverse
direction landing to the north
so we wouldn't have to maneuver around. He told me
the winds would allow for a
landing to the north and would set it up. During the
descent, I made a radio
call to advise our Command Post of what had happened
and our intentions. The CP
controller said they'd all go outside and watch our
(hopefully) successful
landing. I didn't appreciate the levity, I can tell
you.
Since my engines were still rotating with enough
RPMs to allow for normal
configuration, I briefed the crew that I would delay
configuring the aircraft
for landing until we had the field made and then do
a hurried gear lowering and
an approach flap landing so as to reduce the drag on
the aircraft until the
final moments. We would perform as much of the
applicable checklists as
possible but keep the gear and flaps up until we
were assured of making the
field. I told them I was planning to execute a
higher than normal VFR final
approach to runway 36. I briefed each crew member
what I wanted him to do in
addition to his normal checklists. I asked the
Scanner, who had very few duties
during the final approach, to be my flaps and gear
monitor and to call out if
we had omitted lowering them within 5 miles from the
runway. The Navigator was
to be his gear monitoring backup.
Final approach to the field was uneventful. But in
spite of the higher than
normal altitude of my approach, the C-141 ran out of
altitude just a little
beyond the threshold. Roll out and taxi to parking
procedures were normal with
no further problems being encountered. I can tell
you that my flight suit was
drenched with sweat by the time we shut down the
engines.
The Jumpmaster and his entire group made a special
effort to thank my crew and
me for the successful landing before they departed
the aircraft. I never did
find out if they got another jump before their
currency period expired. I also
never found out exactly why those engines failed
although an aircraft commander
friend of mine (some two weeks later) experienced
the same problem with all
four engines when they were at cruise altitude and
about half an hour past the
Canadian coastline enroute on an Atlantic Ocean
crossing. He said that if he
had been five minutes further along the route he
didn't believe he could have
made it back to Goose Bay Royal Canadian Air Base.
Based on these two incidents
happening so close together, when the command post
at Goose informed the MAC
command post of what was happening, the MAC Deputy
Commander for Operations
(DCO) immediately directed that all McGuire C-141
crews in the air world-wide
be contacted and issued an order to find the nearest
airfield and land
immediately until the cause could be determined.
The cause was determined a couple of days later.
Algae had been able to survive
and even grow in the JP-4 fuel storage tanks at
McGuire. No one could believe
that anything alive could survive in such an extreme
environment, but it so
happened that the algae could and did. As I heard
it, when the fuel pumps
within the aircraft's tanks got somewhat clogged
they would begin cavitating
and starve the engines of fuel which would cause
compressor stalls. Since we
had 10 tanks on the C-141, not all engines would
experience the problem at the
same time unless all engines were fed out of the
same tank at the same time
which was a rarity.
The fuels folks at McGuire and on all MAC bases
throughout the world had their
work cut out for them. Before any aircraft out of
McGuire could fly, the fuel
folks had to drain, inspect and clean all fuel tanks
(both storage and
aircraft) plus verify all their tanker trucks and
fueling hoses were free of
contaminants. Fortunately, I heard that some sort of
fuel additive was
available that would kill the algae and ensure a
stop to the algae problem once
all the fuels were passed through some big filters.
I heard that the fuels
folks also had to back-track where the fuel had come
from and inform officials
there of the situation and recommend that they check
their tanks and transport
systems.
©2006 Dudley F. Waters